Israeli Lessons Derived from Russia-Georgia Conflict

One Israeli think tank, the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, published an analysis of the implications of the conflict in Georgia for the Middle East, and specifically Israel. I don't know anything about this center's history and credibility, but they list a number of Israeli generals and defense officials who have recently published papers with them. They seem to be fairly hawkish, but I have no insight on their influence. The report, The Russian-Georgian War: Implications for the Middle East by Ariel Cohen, drew several interesting conclusions, most of which seem to me to be pretty strategically sound, given Israel's world-view, position, and the nature of popular support for activist policies and strategies. That being said, the conclusions are also somewhat scary for the region and for the U.S., as the debacle in Georgia, which has highlighted our inability to help our Georgian allies in a meaningful way, may concurrently be further eroding our already fragile influence in the Middle East. It seems to have convinced at least this Israeli analyst that Israel is even more alone in a realist, self-help world, meaning that American levers on Israeli policy may be shortening significantly, especially once Olmert leaves office and a hawk (probably) replaces him. The report's conclusions:

Watch Out for the Bear - and Other Beasts! Russian continental power is on the rise. Israel should understand it and not provoke Moscow unnecessarily, while defending its own national security interests staunchly. Small states need to treat nuclear armed great powers with respect. Provoking a militarily strong adversary, such as Iran, is worthwhile only if you are confident of victory, and even then there may be bitter surprises. Just ask Saakashvili.

Strategic Self-Reliance. U.S. expressions of support of the kind provided to Georgia - short of an explicit mutual defense pact - may or may not result in military assistance if/when Israel is under attack, especially when the attacker has an effective deterrent, such as nuclear arms deliverable against U.S. targets. In the future, such an attacker could be Iran or an Arab country armed with atomic weapons. Israel can and should rely on its own deterrent - a massive survivable second-strike capability.

Intelligence Failure. U.S. intelligence-gathering and analysis on the Russian threat to Georgia failed. So did U.S. military assistance to Georgia, worth around $2 billion over the last 15 years. This is something to remember when looking at recent American intelligence assessments of the Iranian nuclear threat or the unsuccessful training of Palestinian Authority security forces against Hamas. Both are deeply flawed. There is no substitute for high-quality human intelligence.

Air Power Is Not Sufficient. Russia used air, armor, the Black Sea Fleet,
special forces, and allied militias. Clausewitzian lessons still apply: the use of overwhelming force in the war's center of gravity by implementing a combined air-land-sea operation may be twentieth century, but it does work. Israel should have been taught this lesson after the last war with Hizbullah.

Surprise and Speed of Operations Still Matter - as they have for the four thousand years of the recorded history of warfare. To be successful, wars have to have limited and achievable goals. Russia achieved most of its goals between Friday and Monday, while the world, including President George W. Bush, was busy watching the Olympics and parliaments were on vacation.

Do Not Cringe - within reason - from taking military casualties and inflicting overwhelming military and civilian casualties at a level unacceptable to the enemy. Georgia lost some 100-200 soldiers and effectively capitulated. A tougher enemy, like the Japanese or the Germans, or even Hizbullah, could well suffer a proportionally higher rate of casualties and keep on fighting.

Information and Psychological Warfare Is Paramount. So is cyber-security. It looks like the Russians conducted repeated denial of service attacks against Georgia (and in 2007 against Estonia), shutting down key websites. Russia was ready with accusations and footage of alleged Georgian atrocities in South Ossetia, shifting the information operation playing field from "aggressor-victim" to "saving Ossetian civilians from barbaric Georgians." These operations also matter domestically, to shore up support and boost morale at home.